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ABSTRACT
We consider models of multi-player games where abilities of
players and coalitions are defined in terms of sets of out-
comes which they can effectively enforce. We extend the
well studied state effectivity models of one-step games in
two different ways. On the one hand, we develop multi-
ple state effectivity functions associated with different long-
term temporal operators. On the other hand, we define and
study coalitional path effectivity models where the outcomes
of strategic plays are infinite paths. For both extensions we
obtain representation results with respect to concrete mod-
els arising from concurrent game structures. We also apply
state and path coalitional effectivity models to provide al-
ternative, arguably more natural and elegant semantics to
the alternating-time temporal logic ATL*, and discuss their
technical and conceptual advantages.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial Intel-
ligence—Multiagent Systems; I.2.4 [Artificial Intelligence]:
Knowledge Representation Formalisms and Methods—Modal
logic; J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
Games models, effectivity, strategic logic
1. INTRODUCTION
A wide variety of multi-player games can be modeled by
so called ‘multi-player game models’ a.k.a. ‘concurrent game
structures’ [9, 3] which can be seen as a generalization of ex-
tensive form games or of repeated normal form (strategic)
games. Here, we view them as general models of (qualita-
tive) multi-step games. Intuitively, such game is based on
a labelled transition system where every state is associated
with a normal form game and the transitions between states
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are labelled by tuples of actions,1 one for each player. Thus,
the outcome of playing a normal form game at a given state
is a transition to a new state, respectively to a new normal
form game. In the quantitative version of such games, the
outcome states are also associated with payoff vectors, while
in the version that we consider here, the payoffs are quali-
tative – defined by properties of the outcome states, possi-
bly expressed in a logical language. The players’ objectives
in multi-step games can simply be about reaching a desired
(’winning’) state, or they can be more involved, such as forc-
ing a desired long-term behaviour (transition path, run).
Various logics for reasoning about coalitional abilities in
multi-player games have been proposed and studied in the
last two decades – most notably, Coalition Logic (CL) [9]
and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL* and its frag-
ment ATL) [3]. Coalition Logic can be seen as a logic for
reasoning about abilities of coalitions in one-step (strate-
gic) games to bring about an outcome state with desired
properties by means of single actions, while ATL* allows to
express statements about multi-step scenarios. For example,
the ATL formula 〈〈C〉〉Fϕ says that the coalition of players
(or agents) C can ensure that ϕ will become true at some
future moment, no matter what the other players do; like-
wise, 〈〈C〉〉Gϕ expresses that the coalition C can enforce ϕ
to be always the case. More generally, the ATL* formula
〈〈C〉〉γ holds true iff C has a strategy to ensure that any re-
sulting behavior of the system (i.e., any play of the game)
will satisfy the temporal property γ.
In this paper we study how multi-step games can be mod-
eled and characterized in terms of effectivity of coalitions
with respect to possible outcome states or behaviours, and
how such models can be used to provide conceptually simple
and technically elegant semantics for logics of multi-player
games such as ATL*. The paper has three main objectives:
(i) To extend the semantics for CL based on one-step
coalitional effectivity to semantics for ATL over state-
based coalitional effectivity models;
(ii) To develop the analogous notion of coalitional path ef-
fectivity representing the powers of coalitions in multi-
step games to ensure long-term behaviors, and to pro-
vide semantics for ATL* based on it;
(iii) To obtain characterizations of multi-player game mod-
els in terms of abstract state and path coalitional ef-
fectivity models, analogous to Pauly’s representation
theorem [9, 5].
1Such actions are also called ‘strategies’ in normal form
games, but we reserve the use of the term ‘strategy’ for a
global conditional plan in a multi-step scenario.
We argue that characterizing effectivity of coalitions in
multi-step games in terms of paths (cf. points (ii) and (iii)
above) is conceptually more natural and elegant than in
terms of outcome states, in several respects. First, collective
strategies in such games generate outcome paths (plays), not
just outcome states. Second, one path effectivity function
is sufficient to define the powers of coalitions in a multi-step
game for all kinds of temporal patterns, through the stan-
dard semantics of temporal operators. This point is further
supported by the fact that path effectivity models provide
a straightforward semantics for the whole language of ATL*
(which is not definable by alternation-free fixpoint operators
on the one-step ability). Finally, we argue that path effec-
tivity can just as well be applied to variants of ATL(*) with
imperfect information, where even simple modalities do not
have fixpoint characterizations [6]. Still, also in that case,
executing a strategy ‘cuts out’ a set of possible paths, just
like in the perfect information case.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin by intro-
ducing basic notions in Section 2. In Section 3 we develop
state-based effectivity models that suffice to define seman-
tics of ATL. The models include three different effectivity
functions, one for each basic modality X,G, U . Then, in
Section 4 we develop and study effectivity models based on
paths. We show how they provide semantics to ATL*, and
identify appropriate “playability” conditions, which we use
to establish correspondences between powers of coalitions in
the abstract models and strategic abilities of coalitions in
concurrent game models. Finally, we briefly discuss how the
path-oriented view can be used to facilitate reasoning about
games with imperfect information in Section 5.
2. PRELIMINARIES
We begin by introducing some basic game-theoretic and
logical notions. In all definitions hereafter, the sets of play-
ers, game (outcome) states, and actions available to players
are assumed non-empty. Moreover, the set of players is al-
ways assumed finite.
2.1 Concurrent game models
Strategic games (a.k.a. normal form games) are basic mod-
els of non-cooperative game theory [8]. Following the tradi-
tion in the qualitative study of games we focus on abstract
game modes, where the effect of strategic interaction be-
tween players is represented by abstract outcomes from a
given set and players’ preferences are not specified.
Definition 1 (Strategic game). A strategic game is
a tuple G = (Agt, St, {Acti|i ∈ Agt}, o) consisting of a set
of players (agents) Agt, a set of outcome states St, a set of
actions (atomic strategies) Acti for each player i ∈ Agt, and
an outcome function o :
Q
i∈Agt Acti → St which associates
an outcome with every action profile.
We define coalitional strategies αC in G as tuples of indi-
vidual strategies αi for i ∈ C, i.e., ActC =Qi∈C Acti.
Strategic games are one-step encounters. They can be
generalized to multi-step scenarios, in which every state is
associated with a strategic game. Such games are also known
as concurrent game structures [3].
Definition 2 (Concurrent game structures).
A concurrent game structure (CGS) is a tuple
F = (Agt, St, Act, d, o)
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Figure 1: Repeated matching pennies: a concurrent
game model M1.
which consists of a set of players Agt = {1, . . . , k}, a set
of states St, a set of (atomic) actions Act, a function d :
Agt × St → P(Act) that assigns a sets of actions avail-
able to players at each state, and a (deterministic) transition
function o that assigns the outcome state o(q, α1, . . . , αk) to
every starting state q and a tuple of actions 〈α1, . . . , αk〉,
αi ∈ d(i, q), that can be executed by Agt in q.
A concurrent game model (CGM) is a CGS endowed with
a valuation V : St → P(Prop) for some fixed set of atomic
propositions Prop.
Note that in a CGS all players execute their actions syn-
chronously and the combination of the actions, together with
the current state, determines the transition in the CGS.
Example 1 (Repeated matching pennies). Two ag-
ents play matching pennies repeatedly on a triangular board
in such a way that the initial state of the next game depends
on what they did before. More precisely, showing the heads
means that the player wants to push the token, and show-
ing the tails means that she wants the token to be left in the
same place. Moreover, player 1 can only push the token to
the right, while 2 can only push it to the left. The scenario
can be formalized using the CGM in Figure 1.
Strategies in multi-step games. A path in a CGS/CGM
is an infinite sequence of states that can result from sub-
sequent transitions in the structure/model. A strategy of a
player a in a CGS/CGMM is a conditional plan that spec-
ifies what a should do in each possible situation. Depend-
ing on the type of memory that we assume for the players,
a strategy can be memoryless, formally represented with a
function sa : St→ Act, such that sa(q) ∈ da(q), or a perfect
recall strategy, represented with a function sa : St
+ → Act
such that sa(〈. . . , q〉) ∈ da(q), where St+ is the set of histo-
ries, i.e., finite prefixes of paths in M [3, 10]. A collective
strategy for a group of players C = {a1, ..., ar} is simply a
tuple of strategies sC = 〈sa1 , ..., sar 〉, one for each player
from C. We denote player a’s component of the collective
strategy sC by sC [a].
We define the function out(q, sC) to return the set of all
paths λ ∈ Stω that can be realised when the players in C
follow the strategy sC from state q onward. Formally, for
memoryless strategies, it can be defined as below:
out(q, sC) = {λ = q0, q1, q2... | q0 = q and for each i =
0, 1, ... there exists 〈αia1 , ..., αiak 〉 such that αia ∈ da(qi)
for every a ∈ Agt, and αia ∈ sC [a](qi) for a ∈ C, and
qi+1 = o(qi, α
i
a1 , ..., α
i
ak )}.
The definition for perfect recall strategies is analogous.
2.2 Abstract models of coalitional effectivity
Effectivity functions have been introduced in cooperative
game theory [7] to provide an abstract representation of the
powers of coalitions to influence the outcome of the game.
Definition 3 (Effectivity functions and models).
A local effectivity function E : P(Agt) → P(P(St)) asso-
ciates a family of sets of states with each set of players.
A global effectivity function E : St×P(Agt)→ P(P(St))
assigns a local effectivity function to every state q ∈ St. We
will use the notations E(q)(C) and Eq(C) interchangeably.
Finally, a coalitional effectivity model consists of a global
effectivity function, plus a valuation of atomic propositions.
Intuitively, elements of E(C) are choices available to the
coalition C: if X ∈ E(C) then by choosing X the coalition
C can force the outcome of the game to be in X. The idea
to represent a choice (action) of a coalition by the set of
possible outcomes which can be effected by that choice was
also captured by the notion of ‘alternating transition system’
used originally to provide semantics for ATL in [2].
Definition 4 (True playability [9, 5]). A local ef-
fectivity function E is truly playable iff the following hold:
Outcome monotonicity: X ∈ E(C) and X ⊆ Y implies
Y ∈ E(C);
Liveness: ∅ /∈ E(C);
Safety: St ∈ E(C);
Superadditivity: if C ∩D = ∅, X ∈ E(C) and Y ∈ E(D),
then X ∩ Y ∈ E(C ∪D);
Agt-maximality: X 6∈ E(∅) implies X ∈ E(Agt);
Determinacy: if X ∈ E(Agt) then {x} ∈ E(Agt) for some
x ∈ X.
A global effectivity function is truly playable iff it consists
only of local functions that are truly playable.
α-Effectivity. Each strategic gameG can be canonically as-
sociated with an effectivity function, called the α-effectivity
function of G and denoted with EαG [9].
Definition 5 (α-effectivity in strategic games).
For a strategic game G, the (coalitional) α-effectivity func-
tion EαG : P(Agt) → P(P(St)) is defined as follows: X ∈
EαG(C) if and only if there exists σC such that for all σC we
have o(σC , σC) ∈ X.
Example 2. The α-effectivity for M1, q0 is: E({1, 2}) =
{{q0}, {q1}, {q2}, {q0, q1}, {q0, q2}, {q1, q2}, {q0, q1, q2}};
E({1}) = E({2}) = {{q0, q1}, {q0, q2}, {q0, q1, q2}};
E(∅) = {{q0, q1, q2}}. Clearly, E is truly playable.
Theorem 1 (Representation Theorem [9, 5]). A lo-
cal effectivity function E is truly playable if and only if there
exists a strategic game G such that EαG = E.
2.3 Logical reasoning about multi-step games
The Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL* [2, 3] is a
multimodal logic with strategic modalities 〈〈C〉〉 and tempo-
ral operators X (“at the next state”), G (“always from now
on”), and U (“until”). There are two types of formulae of
ATL*, state formulae and path formulae, respectively de-
fined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈C〉〉γ,
γ ::= ϕ | ¬γ | γ∧γ | Xγ | Gγ | γ U γ, for C ⊆ Agt, p ∈ Prop.
F (“sometime in the future”) can be defined as Fϕ ≡ >U ϕ.
Let M be a CGM, q a state in M , and λ = q0, q1, . . . a
path in M . For every i ∈ N we denote λ[i] = qi; λ[0..i] is the
prefix q0, q1, . . . , qi, and λ[i..∞] is the respective suffix of λ.
The semantics of ATL* is given by the following clauses [3]:
M, q |= p iff q ∈ V (p), for p ∈ Prop;
M, q |= ¬ϕ iff M, q 6|= ϕ;
M, q |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M, q |= ϕ1 and M, q |= ϕ2;
M, q |= 〈〈C〉〉γ iff there is a strategy sC for the players
in C such that for each path λ ∈ out(q, sC) we have
M,λ |= γ.
M,λ |= ϕ iff M,λ[0] |= ϕ;
M,λ |= ¬γ iff M,λ 6|= γ;
M,λ |= γ1 ∧ γ2 iff M,λ |= γ1 and M,λ |= γ2;
M,λ |= Xγ iff M,λ[1,∞] |= γ;
M,λ |= Gγ iff M,λ[i,∞] |= γ for every i ≥ 0; and
M,λ |= γ1 U γ2 iff there is i such that M,λ[i,∞] |= γ2 and
M,λ[j,∞] |= γ1 for all 0 ≤ j < i.
Example 3. Consider again the repeated matching pen-
nies from Example 1. No player can make sure that the token
moves to any particular position (e.g., M1, q0 |= ¬〈〈1〉〉Fpos1).
On the other hand, the player can at least make sure that the
game will avoid particular positions: M1, q0 |= 〈〈1〉〉G¬pos1.
And, if the players cooperate then they control the game com-
pletely: M1, q0 |= 〈〈1, 2〉〉Xpos0∧〈〈1, 2〉〉Xpos1∧〈〈1, 2〉〉Xpos2.
ATL and CL as fragments of ATL*. The most impor-
tant fragment of ATL* is ATL where each strategic modality
is directly followed by a single temporal operator. Thus, the
semantics of ATL can be given entirely in terms of states,
cf. [3] for details. We point out that for ATL the two no-
tions of strategy (memoryless vs. perfect recall) yield the
same semantics.
Furthermore, Coalition Logic (CL) [9] can be seen as the
fragment of ATL involving only booleans and operators 〈〈C〉〉X,
and thus it inherits the semantics of ATL on CGMs.
3. STATE EFFECTIVITY IN MULTI-STEP
GAMES
An alternative semantics of CL has been given in [9] in
terms of the effectivity models defined in section 2.2, via the
following clause, where ϕM := {s ∈ St | M, s |= ϕ}.
M, q |= 〈〈C〉〉Xϕ iff ϕM ∈ Eq(C).
It is easy to see that the CGM-based and effectivity-based
semantics of CL coincide on truly playable models.
The semantics of ATL has never been explicitly defined
in terms of abstract effectivity models. An informal outline
of such semantics has been suggested in [4], essentially by
representation of the modalities 〈〈C〉〉G and 〈〈C〉〉U as appro-
priate fixpoints of 〈〈C〉〉X. The idea was based on the result
from [3] showing that the alternation-free fragment of Alter-
nating µ-Calculus is strictly more expressive that ATL. In
this section, we actually extend state-based effectivity mod-
els to provide semantics for ATL. For that, as pointed out
earlier, a different effectivity function will be needed for each
temporal pattern.
We note that an effectivity function for the“always”modal-
ity G was already constructed in [9]. Moreover, an effectivity
function for reachability, i.e. for the F modality, has been
presented in [1]. Our construction here differs significantly
from both approaches, and allows to cover all kinds of effec-
tivity that can be addressed in ATL.
3.1 Operations on state effectivity functions
First, we define basic operations on effectivity functions,
reflecting the meaning of these as operations on games.
Composition of effectivity functions E,F : St×P(Agt)→
P(P(St)) is the effectivity function E ◦ F where Y ∈ (E ◦
F )q(C) iff there exists a subset Z of St, such that Z ∈ Eq(C)
and Y ∈ Fz(C) for every z ∈ Z.
Union of effectivity functions E,F is the effectivity func-
tion E ∪ F where Y ∈ (E ∪ F )q(C) iff Y ∈ Eq(C) or
Y ∈ Fq(C). Intersection of effectivity functions is defined
analogously. Likewise, we define union and intersection of
any family of effectivity functions. Hereafter, we assume
that ◦ has a stronger binding power than ∪ and ∩.
Inclusion of effectivity functions is defined as follows:
E ⊆ F iff Eq(C) ⊆ Fq(C) for every q ∈ St and C ⊆ Agt.
The idle effectivity function I is defined as follows:
Iq(C) = {Y ⊆ St | q ∈ Y } for every q ∈ St and C ⊆ Agt.
Proposition 2. The following hold for any outcome mono-
tone effectivity functions E,F,G :
1. E ◦ I = I ◦ E = E.
2. If F1 ⊆ F2 then E ◦ F1 ⊆ E ◦ F2.
3. (E ∪ F ) ◦G = (E ◦G) ∪ (E ◦ F ).
4. (E ∩ F ) ◦G = (E ◦G) ∩ (E ◦ F ).
Remark 3. The identities E ◦ (F∪G) = (E◦F ) ∪ (E ◦G)
and E ◦ (F ∩G) = (E ◦ F ) ∩ (E ◦G) are not valid.
Definition 6. For any effectivity function E we define
inductively the effectivity functions E(n) and E[n] as follows:
E(0) = I, E(n+1) = I ∪ E ◦ E(n),
E[0] = I, E[n+1] = I ∩ E ◦ E[n].
Proposition 4. For every n ≥ 0 : E(n) ⊆ E(n+1) and
E[n+1] ⊆ E[n].
Proof. Routine, by induction on n.
Definition 7. The weak iteration of E is the function
E(∗) =
∞S
k=0
E(k), i.e., Y ∈ E(∗)q (C) iff ∃n. Y ∈ E(n)q (C).
The strong iteration of E is the function E[∗] =
∞T
k=0
E[k],
i.e., Y ∈ E[∗]q (C) iff ∀n. Y ∈ E[n]q (C).
Proposition 5. Unions, intersections, compositions, week
and strong iterations preserve outcome-monotonicity of ef-
fectivity functions.
Proposition 6. For any effectivity function E :
1. E(∗) is the least fixed point of the monotone operator
Fw defined by Fw(F ) = I ∪ E ◦ F.
2. E[∗] is the greatest fixed point of the monotone operator
Fq defined by Fq(F ) = I ∩ E ◦ F .
Proof. (1) First, we show by induction on k that for
every k, E(k) ⊆ I ∪ E ◦ E(∗). Indeed, E(0) = I ⊆ I ∪ E ◦
E(∗); E(k+1) = I ∪ E ◦ E(k) ⊆ I ∪ E ◦ E(∗) by the inductive
hypothesis and proposition 2. Thus, E(∗) ⊆ I ∪ E ◦ E(∗).
For the converse inclusion, let Y ∈ (I ∪ E ◦ E(∗))q(C).
If Y ∈ Iq(C), then Y ∈ E(∗)q by definition. Suppose Y ∈
(E ◦ E(∗))q(C). Then, there is Z ∈ Eq(C) such that for ev-
ery z ∈ Z, Y ∈ E(∗)z(C), hence Y ∈ E(kz)z (C) for some
kz ≥ 0. Let m = max
z∈Z
kz. Then, by proposition 4, Y ∈
E
(m)
z (C) for every z ∈ Z. Therefore, Y ∈ (E ◦ E(m))q(C) ⊆
E
(m+1)
q (C) ⊆ E(∗)q (C).
Thus, E(∗) is a fixed point of the operator Fw.
Now, suppose that F is such that Fw(F ) = I ∪ E ◦ F.
Then, we show by induction on k that for every k, E(k) ⊆ F.
Indeed, E(0) = I ⊆ I ∪ E ◦ F = F. Suppose E(k) ⊆ F. Then
E(k+1) = I ∪ E ◦ E(k) ⊆ I ∪ E ◦ F = F by the inductive
hypothesis and proposition 2. Thus, E(∗) ⊆ F. Therefore,
E(∗) is the least fixed point of Fw.
(2). The argument is dually analogous.
3.2 Binary effectivity functions
Definition 8. Given a set of players Agt and a set of
states St, a local binary effectivity function for Agt on St
is a mapping U : P(Agt) → P(P(St)× P(St)) associating
with each set of players a family of pairs of outcome sets.
A global binary effectivity function associates a local bi-
nary effectivity function with each state from St.
Now we define some basic (global) binary effectivity func-
tions and operations on them.
Left-idle binary effectivity function L : St × P(Agt) →
P(P(St)× P(St)) is defined by Lq(C) = {(X,Y ) | q ∈ X}
for any q ∈ St and C ⊆ Agt. Respectively, right-idle binary
effectivity function R is defined by Rq(C) = {(X,Y ) | q ∈
Y } for any q ∈ St and C ⊆ Agt.
Union of binary effectivity functions U,W : St×P(Agt)→
P(P(St)× P(St)) is the binary effectivity function U ∪W
where (X,Y ) ∈ (U ∪W )q(C) iff (X,Y ) ∈ Uq(C) or (X,Y ) ∈
Vq(C). Intersection of binary effectivity functions is defined
analogously. Right projection of U is the unary effectivity
function E such that Eq(C) = {Y | (X,Y ) ∈ Uq(C)} for
all q, C. Likewise, we define union, intersection, and right
projection of any family of binary effectivity functions.
Composition of a unary effectivity function E with a bi-
nary effectivity function U is the binary effectivity function
E◦U such that (X,Y ) ∈ (E◦U)q(C) iff there exists a subset
Z of St, such that Z ∈ Eq(C) and (X,Y ) ∈ Uz(C) for every
z ∈ Z. Inclusion of binary effectivity functions: U ⊆ W iff
Uq(C) ⊆Wq(C) for every q ∈ St and C ⊆ Agt.
Definition 9. For any unary effectivity function E we
define the binary effectivity functions E{n}, n ≥ 0, induc-
tively as follows: E{0} = R;E{n+1} = R∪ (L∩E ◦E{n}).
Then, the binary iteration of E is defined as the binary
effectivity function E{∗} =
∞S
k=0
E{k}, i.e. (X,Y ) ∈ E{∗}q (C)
iff (X,Y ) ∈ E{n}q (C) for some n.
Definition 10. A binary effectivity function U is outcome-
monotone if every Uq(C) is upwards closed, i e. (X,Y )∈ Uq(C)
and X ⊆ X ′, Y ⊆ Y ′ imply (X ′, Y ′)∈ Uq(C).
Proposition 7. For any finite set of states St and unary
effectivity function E, E{∗} is the least fixed point of the
monotone operator Fb defined by Fb(U) = R ∪ (L ∩ E ◦ U).
Proof. Analogous to the proof of proposition 6.
Proposition 8. E(∗), E[∗] and E{∗} are outcome-mono-
tone. Moreover, E(∗) is the right projection of E{∗}.
3.3 State-based effectivity models for ATL
The semantics of ATL can now be given in terms of models
that are more abstract and technically simpler than CGM.
Definition 11. A state-based effectivity frame (SEF) for
ATL is a tuple F = 〈Agt, St,E,G,U〉, where: Agt is a
set of players, St is a set of states, E and G are outcome-
monotone effectivity functions, and U is an outcome-monotone
binary effectivity function.
A state-based effectivity model (SEM) for ATL is a SEF
plus a valuation of atomic propositions.
Definition 12. A SEF F is standard iff (1) E is truly
playable, (2) G = E[∗], and (3) U = E{∗}.
A SEM M = 〈F , V 〉 is standard if F is standard.
Now, we define truth of an ATL formula at a state of a
state-based effectivity model uniformly as follows:
M, q |= 〈〈C〉〉Xϕ iff ϕM ∈ Eq(C),
M, q |= 〈〈C〉〉Gϕ iff ϕM ∈ Gq(C),
M, q |= 〈〈C〉〉ψUϕ iff (ψM, ϕM) ∈ Uq(C).
Extending α-Effectivity to SEM. Given a CGM M =
(Agt, St, Act, d, o, V ), we construct its corresponding SEM
as follows: SEM(M) = (Agt, St,E,G,U) where Eq = E(q)αM
for all q ∈ St, G = E[∗] and U = E{∗}.
Example 4. The “always” effectivity in state q0 of the re-
peated matching pennies can be written as follows: Gq0({1, 2}) =
{{q0}, {q0, q1}, {q0, q2}, {q0, q1, q2}}, Gq0({1}) = Gq0({2}) =
{{q0, q1}, {q0, q2}, {q0, q1, q2}}, Gq0(∅) = {{q0, q1, q2}}.
The next result easily follows from Theorem 1:
Theorem 9 (Representation Theorem). A state ef-
fectivity modelM for ATL is standard iff there exists a CGM
M such that M = SEM(M).
Moreover, we observe that the ATL semantics in CGMs
and in their associated standard SEMs coincide.
Proposition 10. For every CGM M , state q in M , and
ATL formula ϕ, we have that M, q |= ϕ iff SEM(M), q |= ϕ.
Proof. Routine, by structural induction on formulae.
Corollary 11. Any ATL formula ϕ is valid (resp., sat-
isfiable) in concurrent game models iff ϕ is valid (resp., sat-
isfiable) in standard state-based effectivity models.
4. COALITIONAL PATH EFFECTIVITY
State-based effectivity models for ATL partly characterize
coalitional powers for achieving long-term objectives. How-
ever, the applicability of such models is limited by the fact
that they characterize effectivity with respect to outcome
states, while effectivity for outcome paths (i.e., plays) is
only captured when such paths are described by the spe-
cific temporal patterns definable in ATL. Thus, in particular,
state-based effectivity models are not suitable for providing
semantics of the whole ATL*.
In this section we aim at getting to the core of the notion
of effectivity in multi-step games, regardless of the temporal
pattern that defines the winning condition, by re-defining it
in terms of outcome paths, rather than states. The idea is
natural: every collective strategy of the grand coalition in
a multi-step game determines a unique path (play) through
the state space of the game. Consequently, the outcome of
following an individual or coalitional strategy in such game
is a set of paths (plays) that can result from execution of the
strategy, depending on the moves of the remaining players.
Hence, powers of players and coalitions in multi-step games
can be characterized by sets of sets of paths. We claim that
the notion of path effectivity captures adequately the mean-
ing of strategic operators in ATL(*). Moreover, it provides
correct semantics for the whole ATL*, and not only its lim-
ited fragment ATL.
4.1 Frames, models, effectivity functions
Definition 13 (Path effectivity function). Let Agt
be a set of players, and St a set of states. A path in St is
any infinite sequence of states of St. The set of all paths in
St is therefore denoted by Stω. A path effectivity function
is a mapping E : P(Agt) → P(P(Stω)) that assigns to each
coalition a non-empty family of sets of paths.
The intuition is analogous to that for state effectivity: a
set of paths X is in E(C) means that the coalition C can
choose a strategy that ensures that the game will develop
along one of the paths in X. Note that this notion refers to
global effectivity only: X ∈ E(C) can include paths starting
from different states. Local effectivity is easily extractable
from the global one. This is in line with the concept of a
strategy as a complete conditional plan: in particular, the
strategy must prescribe collective actions of the coalition
from all possible initial states of the game.
Also, we will assume that E captures the actual effectiv-
ity, i.e., it collects only the actual outcome paths of choices
available to C, and is not necessarily closed under upwards
monotonicity. We note that the outcome-monotone notion
of effectivity has a somewhat negative meaning, in the sense
that X ∈ E(C) is usually interpreted as “the coalition C
can ensure that the outcome of the game cannot be outside
X”, whereas this does not mean that every element of X is a
feasible outcome. This distinction is conceptual, rather than
technical, but it will influence our construction of effectivity
functions for concrete models. The “actuality” assumption
is necessary to specify appropriate abstract playability con-
ditions characterizing path effectivity in concrete models.
Definition 14 (Path effectivity frames/models).
A path effectivity frame (PEF) is a structure F = (Agt, St, E)
consisting of a set of players Agt, a set of states St and a
path effectivity function E on these. A path effectivity model
(PEM) expands a PEF by a valuation of the propositions
V : Prop→ P(St).
By analogy with identifying choices as sets of outcome
states in state effectivity models, we will refer to sets of
paths in a PEF as ‘choices’, with the intuition that E(C)
defines the strategic choices of the coalition C in a PEF F
as sets of paths in F that C can enforce. However, not every
such path can be a feasible outcome in some concrete model
(i.e, a CGM), but only those that follow existing transitions
in the CGM. So, given a path effectivity frame F , we define
the set of ‘feasible’ paths in F as
PathsF =
[
C⊆Agt
[
X∈E(C)
X.
For a PEM M = (F , V ), we define PathsM = PathsF .
4.2 Path effectivity in concurrent games
Not every set of paths is a feasible choice for a coalition.
Note that the powers of players and coalitions in a game
crucially depend on their available strategies. There are dif-
ferent notions of strategy, e.g., depending on the amount of
memory they can use, so we will parameterize the new no-
tion of α-effectivity with a type (class) of strategies. Every
class of individual strategies of players gives rise to a class of
coalitional strategies obtained by freely combining the indi-
vidual strategies of the participating players.2 We say that
a class Σ of individual and coalitional strategies is feasible if
every coalition has at least one strategy in Σ. Two types of
feasible strategies are especially relevant: perfect recall and
memoryless strategies (introduced in Section 2.1). We will
refer to them with mem and nomem, respectively.
Definition 15 (Σ-effectivity). Let M be a CGM and
Σ =
S
C⊆Agt ΣC be a feasible set of coalitional strategies in
M . The Σ-effectivity function of M is defined as
EΣM (C) = {
[
q∈St
out(q, sC) | sC ∈ ΣC}.
Specifically, we denote by EmemM and EnomemM the effectivity
of coalitions respectively for perfect recall strategies and for
memoryless strategies in M . Note that EΣM collects only the
actual outcome paths of actual choices of coalitions in M .
Example 5. The difference between perfect recall and mem-
oryless effectivity is most easily seen in the case of the grand
coalition: EmemM = {{λ} | λ ∈ {q0, q1, q2}ω}, but EnomemM =
{{(qi)ω} | i ∈ {0, 1, 2}} ∪ {{qi(qj)ω}} ∪ {{(qiqj)ω}} ∪
{{qiqj(qk)ω} | i 6= j} ∪ {{qi(qjqk)ω} | i 6= j} ∪ {{(qiqjqk)ω} |
i 6= j}. That is, the players can enforce any sequence of
states when they have perfect memory, but only the “peri-
odic” ones in the memoryless case.
For a class Σ of strategies in a CGM M we denote the set
of paths feasible with respect to Σ in M by PathsΣM . For any
path effectivity function E we denote the set of all feasible
paths in E , i.e., appearing in any choice of E , by PathsE .
Proposition 12. For every CGM M and a feasible class
Σ of coalitional strategies in M :
1. Every coalition has a collective strategy, and therefore
for every state q in M it can enforce at least one, non-
empty set of outcome paths starting from q. (Safety)
2. For any coalition C in M , every coalitional strategy
produces a non-empty set of outcome paths. (Liveness)
2Here we adhere to the standard ATL assumption that play-
ers in a coalition execute their parts of the joint strategy
independently.
3. EΣM (∅) is a singleton. More precisely, EΣM (∅) = {PathsΣM}.
4. EΣM (Agt) consists of singleton sets. More precisely,
EΣM (Agt) = {{λ} | λ ∈ PathsΣM}. (Determinacy)
5. Every two disjoint coalitions can join their chosen coali-
tional strategies to enforce an outcome set of paths that
is included in the outcome set of paths enforceable by
each of the coalitions following its respective strategy.
(Superadditivity)
To define“playability”conditions for path effectivity frames,
we will need some additional notation. Let q ∈ St, h, h′ ∈
St+, X ∈ P(Stω), and X ∈ P(P(Stω)). Then we denote:
• h  h′ if h′ is an extension of h;
• X(q) := {λ ∈ X | λ[0] = q}; X[i] := {λ[i] | λ ∈ X}
• X(h) := {λ | λ ∈ X, and λ[0..k] = h for some k} is
the set of paths in X starting with h;
• X|h := {λ[k..∞] | λ ∈ X and λ[0..k] = h} is the set of
suffixes of paths in X, extending h;
• X (q) = {X(q) | X ∈ X}, X (h) = {X(h) | X ∈ X},
and X|h = {X|h | X ∈ X}.
4.3 Path effectivity semantics of ATL*
Given an ATL* path formula γ and a path effectivity
model M , let
γM = {λ ∈ PathsM |M,λ |= γ}.
denote the set of paths in M that satisfy γ. Note that rela-
tion M,λ |= γ is already well defined by the relevant seman-
tic clauses in Section 2.3 (it is essentially the semantics of
Linear Time Logic LTL). Then, the path effectivity seman-
tics of ATL* is given by the clause below:
M, q |= 〈〈C〉〉γ iff there is X ∈ E(C) such that X(q) ⊆ γM .
Equivalently: M, q |= 〈〈C〉〉γ iff γM (q) ∈ bE(C)(q), wherebE(C) = {X | Y ⊆ X for some Y ∈ E(C)} is the outcome-
monotone closure of E .
Thus, path effectivity models yield a conceptually simple
and technically elegant semantics of ATL*, where one effec-
tivity function suffices to completely describe the powers of
coalitions to enforce any ATL*-definable behaviour. In par-
ticular, only one simple semantic clause is needed to define
strategic ability in ATL*, because the temporal patterns are
appropriately handled by LTL semantics.
Example 6. Like before, we have EM1 , q0 |= 〈〈1, 2〉〉Fposi
for every i = 0, 1, 2 in both perfect recall and memoryless
strategies. This can be demonstrated e.g. by the choice {q0(qi)ω}
that belongs to EmemM1 ({1, 2}) as well as EnomemM1 ({1, 2}).
4.4 Characterizing path effectivity functions
The path effectivity semantics for ATL* defined above is
too abstract to be of practical use. Here we identify the
characteristic properties of path effectivity functions arising
in CGMs and define an analogue of the notion of (truly)
playable state effectivity functions.
Definition 16 (Playability in path effectivity).
A path effectivity function E : P(Agt) → P(P(Stω)) is ac-
tually playable if it satisfies the following conditions:
P-Safety: E(C)(q) is non-empty for every C ⊆ Agt, q ∈ St.
P-Liveness: ∅ /∈ E(C)(q) for every C ⊆ Agt, q ∈ St.
P-Monotonicity: For every C1 ⊆ C2 ⊆ Agt and for every
X2 ∈ E(C2) there is a X1 ∈ E(C1) such that X2 ⊆ X1.
P-Superadditivity: if C∩D = ∅, X ∈ E(C) and Y ∈ E(D),
then Z ∈ E(C ∪D) for some Z ⊆ X ∩ Y .
P-∅-Minimality: E(∅) is the singleton {PathsE}.
P-Determinacy: E(Agt)(q) ⊆ {{λ} | λ ∈ PathsE}.3
We note that the playability conditions above are variants
of true playability, sans outcome monotonicity, for path-
oriented effectivity. These conditions can be adapted to
state effectivity to provide abstract characterization for ac-
tual state effectivity in CGMs, analogous to Pauly’s charac-
terization of the outcome-monotone state effectivity in [9].
For lack of space we do not include that result here.
Besides the general conditions in Definition 16, we need
additional constraints which are specific to the underlying
class of strategies, and relate local choices with global strate-
gies in path effectivity frames.
Path effectivity functions for memoryless strategies
The following definition formalizes the consistency of a
family of local choices with a global memoryless strategy.
Definition 17 (nomem-consistent family of choices).
Given a PEF F = (Agt, St, E) and a coalition C ⊆ Agt,
let X = {Xq}q∈St be such that Xq ∈ E(C)(q) for every
q ∈ St. We call X nomem-consistent if for every pair of
states q1, q2 ∈ St, path λ ∈ Xq1 , and a prefix h = λ[0..i] for
some i ∈ N such that λ[i] = q2, it holds that Xq1 |h = Xq2 .
Definition 18 (nomem-realizability). A playable path
effectivity function E : P(Agt) → P(P(Stω)) is nomem-
realizable if it also satisfies the following conditions:
nomem-Regularity: For every C ⊆ Agt and X ∈ E(C), the
family {X(q)}q∈St is nomem-consistent.
nomem-Convexity: Let {Xq}q∈St s.t. Xq ∈ E(C)(q) for all
q ∈ St, be nomem-consistent. Then the set of all paths
generated by the relation {(q, q′) | q ∈ St, q′ ∈ Xq[1]}
is in E(C).
LimitClosure: Every X ∈ E(C) is limit-closed, i.e., for
every path λ, if every λ[0..i], for i ∈ N, is a prefix of
some path λi ∈ X, then λ ∈ X.
Thus, nomem-regularity of E means that when coalition C
follows a fixed memoryless strategy which determines a set of
outcome paths X, it is effective for the same set of outcome
paths starting from every occurrence of q along any path
from X, viz. X(q). Moreover, nomem-convexity requires
that any consistent collection of ‘locally applied’ strategies
for a given coalition C can be pieced together into a global
memoryless strategy for C.
Theorem 13 (nomem-Representation theorem).
A path effectivity function E equals EnomemM for some concur-
rent game model M if and only if it is nomem-realizable.
3Unlike the case of state effectivity functions, where the de-
terminacy constraint is only needed for infinite state games
(cf. [5]), it becomes essential here, because even very simple
2-state structures can generate uncountably many paths.
Proof. (Sketch) Showing that for every CGMM , EnomemM
is nomem-realizable is fairly routine. For the converse impli-
cation, given a nomem-realizable path effectivity function E
we first define a global actual state effectivity function AE
by collecting for every C and q the successor states from each
set of paths in E(C)(q) and thus producing AE(C)(q). Then
we produce the respective global state effectivity function E
by closing AE under upwards monotonicity. It is straight-
forward to show that E is truly playable by the actual path
playability of E . Then using the representation theorem for
truly playable state effectivity functions in [5] we construct
a CGM M for the same set of agents Agt and state space
St, such that the α-effectivity function EαM of M coincides
with E. UsingM we construct the respective path effectivity
function EnomemM according to Definition 15. Finally, we show
that it coincides with E by using the nomem-realizability of
each of E and EnomemM .
Path effectivity functions for perfect recall strategies
Here we provide a partial characterization of path effec-
tivity functions for perfect recall strategies.
Definition 19 (mem-consistent family of choices).
Given a PEF F = (Agt, St, E) and a coalition C ⊆ Agt,
let X = {Xh}h∈St+ be such that Xh ∈ E(C)(h) for ev-
ery h ∈ St+. We call X mem-consistent if for every pair
h1, h2 ∈ St+ such that h1  h2, we have Xh1(h2) = Xh2 .
Definition 20 (mem-Realizable effectivity).
A playable path effectivity function E : P(Agt)→ P(P(Stω))
is mem-realizable if it also satisfies the following conditions
for every coalition C:
mem-Regularity: For every C ⊆ Agt and X ∈ E(C), the
family {X(q)}q∈St is mem-consistent.
mem-Convexity: Let {Xh}h∈St+ , where Xh ∈ E(C)(h) for
every h ∈ St+, be mem-consistent. Then the set of all
paths generated by the relation
{(q, q′) | q = Xh|h[0], q′ ∈ Xh|h[1]} is in E(C).
LimitClosure: as in Definition 18.
Intuition for the mem-Regularity condition: if C can be
efective for X|h after history h, they can obtain it right at
the beginning of the game starting from q = last(h). This
is because every substrategy of a perfect recall strategy is
also a viable perfect recall strategy. Intuition for the mem-
Convexity condition: any ‘consistent’ collection of history-
based local choices for a given coalition C can be pieced
together into a global perfect recall strategy for C.
The following is easy to check.
Proposition 14. For every CGM M , EmemM is mem-reali-
zable.
For lack of space we defer the respective representation
theorem for perfect recall strategies to a further work.
5. BEYOND PERFECT INFORMATION
So far, we have only been concerned with games where
every player knows the global state of the system at any mo-
ment. Modeling and reasoning about imperfect information
scenarios is more sophisticated. First, not all strategies are
executable – even in the perfect recall case. This is because
the agents cannot specify that they will execute two different
actions in situations that look the same to them. Therefore,
only uniform strategies are admissible here. Moreover, it is
often important to find a uniform strategy that succeeds in
all indistinguishable for the agent states, rather than con-
tend that there is such a successful strategy for the current
state of the system.
In this section, we briefly sketch how path effectivity mod-
els can be used to give account on powers of coalitions under
imperfect information. This is by no means intended as an
exhaustive analysis. Rather, we point out that the modeling
power of path effectivity can be applied to more sophisti-
cated scenarios than ones assuming complete knowledge.
We take Schobbens’ ATLir [10] as the “core”, minimal
ATL-based language for strategic ability under imperfect in-
formation. ATLir includes the same formulae as ATL, only
the cooperation modalities are presented with a subscript:
〈〈A〉〉ir to indicate that they address agents with imperfect
information and imperfect recall. Models of ATLir are im-
perfect information concurrent game models (iCGM), which
can be seen as concurrent game models augmented with a
family of indistinguishability relations ∼a⊆ St×St, one per
agent a ∈ Agt. The relations describe agents’ uncertainty:
q ∼a q′ means that, while the system is in state q, agent a
considers it possible that it is in q′.
A uniform strategy for agent a is a function sa : St→ Act,
such that: (1) sa(q) ∈ d(a, q); (2) if q ∼a q′ then sa(q) =
sa(q
′). A collective strategy is uniform if it contains only
uniform individual strategies. Again, function out(q, sA) re-
turns the set of all paths that may result from agents A
executing strategy sA from state q onward. The semantics
of cooperation modalities in ATL∗ir is defined as follows:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ir γ iff there exists a uniform collective strat-
egy sA such that, for each a ∈ A, q′ such that q ∼a q′,
and path λ ∈ out(sA, q′), we have M,λ |= γ.
First, we observe that the same type of effectivity func-
tions can be used to model powers in imperfect information
games: E : P(Agt) → P(P(Stω)). Moreover, the notion
of Σ-effectivity does not change. Given an iCGM M and
Σ =
S
C⊆Agt ΣC be a set of (uniform) coalitional strate-
gies in M , the Σ-effectivity function of M is still defined as
EΣM (C) = {
S
q∈St out(q, sC) | sC ∈ ΣC}.
The semantics of ATL∗ir is also very similar to the perfect
information case:
M, q |= 〈〈C〉〉ir γ iff there is X ∈ E(C) such that[
a∈C
[
q′:q∼aq′
X(q′) ⊆ γM .
That is, 〈〈C〉〉ir γ if C have a single choice satisfying γ on all
outcome paths starting from states that look the same as q.
What changes is the structural properties of actual effec-
tivity functions that are induced by iCGM’s. Agt-maximality
and determinacy are no longer valid since even the grand
coalition cannot always enforce every possible course of events,
cf. [6]. The regularity and convexity conditions must also
be revised because the standard fixpoint characterizations
of the temporal modalities do not hold anymore under im-
perfect information [6]. The detailed study of appropriate
realizability conditions is subject to future research.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have developed the idea of characteriz-
ing multi-player multi-step games in terms of what sets of
outcomes – states or paths – coalitions can ensure by exe-
cuting one or another collective strategy. These character-
izations lead to respective notions of state-based and path-
based coalition effectivity models, which provide alternative
semantics for logics of such games, most notably ATL and
ATL*. We find such characterizations both conceptually im-
portant and technically interesting because they extract the
core game-theoretic essence from game models. They also
resolve some technical issues arising in the original seman-
tics for ATL*, particularly in the cases of incomplete and
imperfect information. We believe that the understanding of
abstract realizability under imperfect information can lead
to satisfiability checking procedures and complete axiomatic
characterization for these variants of ATL.
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